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Abstract 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in Central Asia five new 
independent states –Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan – found themselves in a highly globalised international system and a 
liberalized economic order. One of the reflections of the drastic changes in the 
dynamics of the region is the growing tension over the waters of Amu Darya and 
Syr Darya rivers.  Since 1991, transboundary water management has become one 
of the most complex security problems among newly independent Central Asian 
states. This article analyses the efforts to form a regional water regime in the 
region, within the context of a regional security complex explanation, and 
explores the role of internal and external dynamics on regional cooperation over 
water resources.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in Central Asia, five new 
independent states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan – found themselves in a highly globalised international system and a 
liberalized economic order. Their present borders and infrastructure designed by 
the Soviet Union were based on the idea of an unbreakable union of republics. As 
a result, integration of these newly independent republics into a globalised 
international system and liberalized economic order was a real challenge. Besides 
the systemic challenge, Central Asian governments have had difficulties dealing 
with internal problems, such as stagnating economies, high levels of corruption 
and environmental degradation, each as a result of their loss of traditional revenue 
from Moscow (Weinthal 2000). 
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After 1991, Russia’s preoccupation with its internal economic and political crisis 
led to an involuntary disengagement from Central Asia. Thus, it has made it easier 
for the Central Asian governments to pursue their own foreign policies and 
national security agendas. Growing engagement of other regional powers - 
Turkey, Iran, China - into Central Asia as well as the global powers - the US and 
the EU - is a consequence of the Russian disengagement from the region (Jonson 
& Allison 2001). 
 
Central Asia’s location at the crossroads of Eurasia and its rich oil and gas 
reserves have attracted external actors’ attention. Since its war against terrorism, 
the US has been actively involved in the region in terms of economic and military 
aid. But the claim that the active engagement of external powers in the region 
would pave the way for the Central Asian states to overcome economic and 
political problems and resolve conflicts has not yet been confirmed. Rather, the 
engagement of external actors’ has caused intensification in the division among 
regional actors (Jonson & Allison 2001). 
 
One of the reflections of the drastic changes in internal and external dynamics of 
the region is the growing tension over the waters of Amu Darya and Syr Darya 
rivers (see figure 1: Map of Aral Sea Basin) The misallocation of waters from 
these rivers has been one of the key issues contributing to the tension among 
riparian states. Disputes have developed between the downstream countries, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which are heavy consumers of water 
for agriculture, and the upstream countries, Kyrgyztan and Tajikistan. Whereas 
large scale water is required by the downstream states in order to support their 
growing agricultural sector, upstream countries also need more water for 
electricity generation and farming (ICG Asia Report 2002). 
 
Given its economic value, water problems can be considered as a security threat 
for the Aral Sea basin republics, especially for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. As 
a result of the dissolution of the integrated Soviet economic system, water based 
economic structures have weakened and paved the way for the promotion of 
national economic interests and mutually incompatible demands for water 
(Horsman 2001). On the other hand, disputes over water allocation and 
desiccation of the Aral Sea have offered a soft issue for external actors, some of 
which have a more direct and negative influence on the security dynamics of the 
region. 
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FIGURE 1. THE ARAL SEA BASIN  
 
Source: Dukhovny and Sokolov (2003) 
 
The main hypothesis of this article is that hydropolitics are an indispensable part 
of the regional security complex that exists where states share the same river 
basin. Therefore, the possibility of conflict or cooperation over transboundary 
water issues should be analysed within the context of security dynamics of the 
particular region. In order to visualize this hypothesis, transboundary water 
management efforts on the Aral Sea basin among five Central Asian states will be 
examined. The efforts to develop a regional water regime will be analysed within 
the context of a regional security complex and security dynamics in Central Asia. 
In light of the analysis, the following question will be addressed: To what extent 
are external and internal security dynamics interacting in the resolution of 
disputes over river basins and in the development of a water regime? 
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In the first part of the article five Central Asian Republics will be analysed as a 
regional security complex. Here Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s regional security 
complex theory will be applied since the theory aims at empirical studies on 
specific regions. Moreover, regional security complex theory offers a systematic 
framework in the study of internal conditions, relations among units in the region, 
relations between regions, and the role of global actors. In this section, internal 
and external security dynamics of Central Asia will be explored within the 
framework of regional security complex theory.  
 
The second part of the article will focus on the hydropolitics of the Aral Sea. In 
order to analyse hydropolitics of the region and regional states’ efforts to form an 
institutionalised water regime, international regime theory will be examined. In 
light of regime theory, the disputes and cooperation efforts over the allocation of 
waters of Amu Darya and Syr Darya will be explored. 
 
CENTRAL ASIA AS A REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX  
In People, States and Fear (1991), Buzan defines security complex as “a group of 
states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their 
national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from another” (Buzan 
1991:190). Later, the definition of a regional security complex was reformulated 
by Buzan and Wæver to include the possibility of different actors besides states 
and several sectors besides the military sector.  It is redefined as “a set of units 
whose major processes of securitisation,37 desecuritisation, or both are so 
interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved 
apart from one another” (Buzan and Wæver 2003:44). The states in a particular 
regional complex must possess security interdependence sufficient enough to 
establish a set and to differentiate them from neighbouring security regions. That 
is to say, regional security complexes are defined as substructures of the 
international system by possessing a relative intensity of security interdependence 
among units and security indifference between and surrounding them (Buzan and 
Wæver 2003). 
 
 
37 According to Ole Wæver (1993) securitisation and de-securitisation are related to the questions of 
when, why and how do elites label issues and developments as security problems? When, why and 
how do they succeed and fail respectively? What attempts are made by other groups to press 
securitisation on the agenda?  
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Considering the anarchical characteristic of the international system, regional 
security complexes are defined with two types of relations: power relations and 
patterns of amity and enmity. Like the international system, regional security 
complexes could be examined in terms of power relations and they could be 
classified as unipolar, bipolar, tri-polar or multi-polar. Moreover, within a 
particular regional security complex the concept of regional balance of power 
plays a significant role (Buzan and Wæver 2003). On the other hand, external 
factors are also effective in stimulating changes in the power balance in the 
region, taking the form of alignments with particular regional units. Besides 
regional power relations, regional security complexes are mainly determined by 
patterns of amity (relationships raging from genuine friendship to expectations of 
protection and support) and enmity (relationships set by suspicion and fear) 
among regional actors (Jonson & Allison 2001). The patterns of amity and enmity 
are socially constructed within historical factors or common cultures.  
 
In order to better understand regional security dynamics, either cooperative or 
conflictual, it is inevitable to explore the interactions of internal and external 
factors. In most cases, regional security complexes are penetrated by outside 
powers. The interplay of internal and external factors determines the structure for 
interaction both at the regional and international level. As it can be observed in 
some cases like the EU, intensification of contacts and exchanges within 
particular regional security complexes promote security cooperation in the form of 
a security community (Jonson & Allison 2001).  
 
According to Buzan and Wæver, the most well-established function of regional 
security complex theory is that it offers a framework for empirical studies of 
regional security by specifying four levels of analysis: (1) domestic, in the states 
of the region; (2) state-to-state relations; (3) the region’s interaction with 
neighbouring regions; and (4) the role of global powers in the region.  These four 
levels of analysis constitute the security constellation in the specified region 
(Buzan & Wæver 2003). 
 
When it comes to the five Central Asian states, although they are defined as parts 
of a larger security complex around Russia, they could be considered a candidate 
for a separate regional security complex. Buzan and Wæver classify Central Asia 
as a sub-complex in a process of forming internal dynamics. Moreover, the 
Central Asian republics consist of a more or less consistent system based on 
geographical and cultural terms. In security terms the region has its own dynamics 
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and preoccupations, although each individual state pursues their own national 
policies, and their security policies are interconnected (Jonson & Allison 2001). 
On the other hand, there are questions raised with regards to a regional security 
complex consisting of five Central Asian republics. Are there obvious common 
grounds for security interactions among the units? Is it possible to consider a 
Central Asian security complex without Afghanistan, which plays a significant 
role in exporting instabilities across the region? Is it possible to distinguish a 
Central Asian security complex from a Caucasian security complex?   
 
Given the configuration of forces, interests and threats, Burnashev discerns three 
circles of participants in the Central Asian Security Complex: (1) the Inner Circle, 
consisting of regional states including Afghanistan; (2) the Second Circle, 
including actors with vitally important and important national interests in the 
inner circle like Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey; and (3) the Third 
Circle, encompassing actors that either have their own interests in the region or 
are capable of playing a substantial role such as the US and the EU (Burnashev 
2002). 
 
For the purpose of this article, only five Central Asian Republics will be taken 
into consideration with their ongoing process of forming a transboundary water 
regime as a part of their overall security considerations. Afghanistan and its 
possible involvement in the Central Asian water regime will not be considered as 
part of the analysis. Furthermore, the Caucasus sub-security complex will be 
separated from the Central Asian one because of the obvious geographical and 
geo-strategic differences, as well as cross cutting differences such as the 
importance and nature of religiosity and the possession or absence of oil.  
 
Central Asia consists of five fairly weak states without any leading power among 
them, despite Uzbekistan’s will to be most powerful actor in the region. Since 
their independence, dynamics of destabilization have played a major role in the 
regional states’ development. For the regional states, with each passing year, 
problems are getting deeper and deeper. The main problems common for all 
regional states are various degrees of bad governance and internal instability; low 
socio-economic standards and varying degrees of dependence on Russia; shortage 
and mismanagement of natural resources, i.e. water; and a high degree of 
vulnerability to “new threats” such as crime, smuggling, drug trafficking, terrorist 
infiltration and uncontrolled migration (Bailes 2003). Furthermore, for most of the 
Central Asian governments, Islamic extremism is the major threat for their 
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countries’ stability. As a result of these security challenges, military expenditures 
have been rising in most of the Central Asian republics. But, as illustrated in 
Figure 2 (Military Expenditures of Five Central Asian States), military 
expenditures constitute 1-2 percent of GDP for all these countries except 
Turkmenistan, whose military expenditure was 3.8 percent of GDP in 2000. This 
is an extension of Turkmenistan’s neutral position and its ambition to be self-
sufficient in terms of military security (Perlo-Freeman & Stålenheim 2003). 
 
Tajikistan is the poorest among the five republics of Central Asia. With the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan was faced with serious economic 
problems. The civil war in 1997 between Moslem opposition and the Tajik 
government has also caused damages to the infrastructure and economic structures 
of the country. As its economy is highly dependent on agriculture, the issue of 
water allocation is a vital issues for Tajikistan. However, in contrast to other 
regional states, Tajikistan has not suffered from water shortages due to its 
upstream position over both Amu Darya and Syr Darya. With regards to its 
relations with other regional republics, Tajikistan with its largely Persian 
population has a strategic inclination toward Iran and Afghanistan rather than 
toward “modern and secular” models.  This is leading to fear among other 
republics that if Tajikistan’s radical Islamic movement gains control, it will 
attempt to influence neighbouring countries (Alaolmolki 2001). 
 
Krgyztan is the most vulnerable among the Central Asian Republics, in terms of 
dealing with security threats, due to its lack of military and economic structures. 
This was evident when armed militant Islamist groups attacked Fergana Valley - a 
valley shared by Kyrgyztan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Because of this 
vulnerability, Kyrgyztan still depends on Russia for military assistance 
(Alaolmolki 2001). With regards to the importance of water resources for 
Krgyztan, like Tajikistan, Kyrgyztan’s population heavily depends on agriculture.  
In addition, hydroelectricity is also of vital importance for the Kyrgyz economy 
(Alaolmolki 2001). 
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FIGURE 2. MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF THE 5 CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS38
 
All figures in US $Million, at constant 2000 prices and exchange rates and for 
calendar year 
. . = Data not available or not applicable ( ) = Uncertain figure, [ ] = estimate. 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Military expenditure in constant US dollars 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Uzbekistan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  92.8  77.7  104  [121]  ..  184  ..  137  ..  
Military expenditure as a share (%) of gross domestic product (GDP) 
  
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Uzbekistan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  1.5  1.1  1.2  [1.4]  ..  1.7  ..  1.1  
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Military expenditure in constant US dollars 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Kazakhstan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  (248)  (158)  163  177  165  188  137  143  210  [202]  
Military expenditure as a share (%) of gross domestic product (GDP) 
  
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Kazakhstan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  (1.0)  (0.9)  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.3  0.9  0.8  1.0  
 
TURKMENISTAN 
Military expenditure in constant US dollars 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Turkmenistan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  102  90.5  87.1  132  112  121  [163]  ..  ..  
Military expenditure as a share (%) of gross domestic product (GDP) 
  
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Turkmenistan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  1.8  2.3  2.0  4.0  3.1  3.4  [3.8]  ..  
                                                 
38 Source for all countries: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2004)  
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TAJIKISTAN 
Military expenditure in constant US dollars 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Tajikistan ..  ..  ..  ..  24.7  102  32.4  [9.4]  10.1  14.4  12.8  13.8  11.9  11.9  ..  
Military expenditure as a share (%) of gross domestic product (GDP) 
  
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Tajikistan ..  ..  ..  ..  0.4  3.9  1.7  [1.1]  1.3  1.7  1.3  1.4  1.2  1.2  
 
KYRGYZTAN 
Military expenditure in constant US dollars 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Kyrgyzstan ..  ..  ..  ..  11.8  9.5  8.9  16.3  15.4  18.7  17.4  20.9  24.6  [24.9]  ..  
Military expenditure as a share (%) of gross domestic product (GDP) 
  
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Kyrgyzstan ..  ..  ..  ..  0.7  0.7  0.9  1.7  1.5  1.6  1.5  1.7  1.8  [1.7]  
 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2004) 
 
In Uzbekistan, Islamic extremism and the fear of “Tajikisation” of the country are 
perceived as the main security threats. Thus, this situation has forced the Uzbek 
government to make the army, which is the largest military organization in the 
region, ready and reform the armed forces. As an extension of its aggressive 
policy against extreme Islamic movements, Uzbekistan has been one of the 
enthusiastic supporters of the US-led war against transnational terrorism. The 
Uzbek government has agreed to the deployment of 1500 American troops and, in 
return, the US provided Uzbekistan USD 160 million in aid in 2002 (Rasizade 
2002). This economic assistance and security guarantees have paved the way for 
the Uzbek government’s ambitions to be the regional hegemon. Despite its 
military strength, Uzbekistan is very vulnerable in terms of maintaining its 
agricultural sector, which is the main sector of the Uzbek economy. The 
agricultural sector, based mainly on monocultures of cotton, is steadily declining 
because of the water supply problems, soil degradation and droughts. Due to its 
reliance on cotton production and its objectives for food self-sufficiency, 
Uzbekistan views irrigation as one of the key security issues.  
 
 87 
Turkmenistan is the most stable country of the region. The Turkmen government 
has been successful in containing any significant political opposition within the 
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country. In contrast to other regional states, Turkmenistan has stressed its neutral 
position and within this context has started a massive increase in the size of its 
armed forces (Perlo-Freemen & Stålenheim 2003). As Turkmenistan has the 
fourth largest gas reserves in the world, its economy is mainly based on the export 
of natural gas and related products (Alaolmolki 2001). In spite of its sufficient 
income from natural gas, Turkmenistan has aimed to achieve food self-
sufficiency. As a result, like Uzbekistan, the issue of water allocation is viewed as 
a part of national security by the Turkmen government.  
 
Kazakhstan, thanks to its rich endowment of natural resources, has the most 
developed economy in the region. It is the second largest oil producer among the 
former Soviet Republics, producing over five hundred thousand barrels per day. 
Because of its oil and mineral resources, Kazakhstan has the potential for 
attracting foreign investment. Its economy is virtually self-sufficient with a well-
developed agricultural sector, a productive extractive industry, and an extensive 
transportation network (Rumer 2002). In terms of social and political threats, 
unlike other Central Asian states, a militant Islamic threat has been less visible in 
Kazakhstan As with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, water resources for irrigation 
is one of the security issues for Kazakhstan.  
 
Since their independence, the Central Asian republics have tried to overcome the 
acute internal problems and external challenges. Another major problem of the 
region is the disunified character of the regional states due to the fact that each 
individual state has acted to defend its own interests and ensure its survival. This 
self-interested behaviour of the Central Asian states has led to tensions among 
them particularly in terms of conflicts over water and energy resources. As a 
result of these acute internal problems and external challenges accompanied with 
conflictual interests, the Central Asian republics remain as weak states and 
dependent on alignments with powerful external powers.   
 
The major problems inherent in the internal dynamics of the region, which are 
also interlinked with each other, are the lack of regional cooperation and the 
unsettled disputes over natural resources. As already briefly touched upon, the 
Central Asian states are sharing similar problems after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union with different paths to overcome these problems. As an extension of 
the common threats and problems, they have tried to form institutions for 
developing cooperation among them. Up until now, all of the institutional 
structural efforts were able to achieve full participation of all five republics except 
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for the case of water management institutions.  In spite of these cooperative 
regional efforts, according to Jonson and Allison, conflictual dynamics are more 
deeply embedded in the region (Jonson & Allison 2001). 
 
Apart from disputes over water allocation, security problems in the region are 
generally transnational, e.g. international terrorism (mainly Islamic terror 
activities) and illegal trafficking, not inter-state. According to Buzan and Wæver 
(2003), no pattern of amity and enmity has formed among regional states. The 
most remarkable characteristics of internal dynamics within the Central Asian 
security complex is the existence of lower level structural alignments among 
regional states. In general regional states have not formed structural alignments as 
a result of their self-interested policies. “Nobody is looking to set up a system of 
alliances between the republics of Central Asia” (Roy in Buzan and Wæver 2003). 
Thus, regional dynamics have formed at other levels. Regional states prefer to 
develop structural alignments with powerful actors from the second or third circle 
such as Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia, Uzbekistan’s pro-American attitudes, 
and Kyrgyztan’s military dependency on Russia.  Furthermore, within the regional 
context, the ongoing competition between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and 
Uzbekistan’s ambition to be the regional hegemon on the one hand and 
Turkmenistan’s unilateral isolationist regional policy on the other have shaped the 
power relations within the inner circle of the regional security complex. 
Competitions have influenced Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s 
alignments with regional states as well as other external actors.  
 
In the second and third circle of the regional security complex, the policies of 
Russia, China, Turkey, Iran and the US might be seen.  The relations between 
these extra regional actors and regional actors are characterized by economic 
consideration, gaining control over the region’s rich energy resources, security 
concerns, and historical and cultural backgrounds. The strategic interests of 
external powers are changing in a broad spectrum from maintaining the status quo 
to increasing their own influence in the region. Within this context, Russia, China, 
Iran, Turkey and the US are the major external powers which link their national 
interests to Central Asia.  
 
Besides its geo-strategic considerations, Russia has two reasons to be involved in 
Central Asia: (1) to protect ethnic Russians in the region; and (2) to maintain 
access to important natural resources, such as oil, natural gas and some other 
minerals, of the region (Jones 2000). However, Russia’s own internal problems 
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have not allowed a deep involvement in the region. With the exception of 
Kazakhstan, which has a long border with Russia and a fairly large Russian 
population, and Kyrgyztan, which depends on Russia in terms of military 
assistance, Russia has not actively engaged with the Central Asian republics.  
 
On the other hand, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union it was expected that 
Turkey and Iran would play crucial roles in the region. In order to fill the political 
vacuum after the collapse of the Union, both Iran and Turkey attempted to 
establish ties, mainly based on ethnicity, language, culture, religion, geography 
and economics, with particular Central Asian states. Iran has been attracted by the 
prospect of its own sphere of influence in the region. In the beginning, Iran tried 
to become a source of religious inspiration, especially for Tajikistan, but since 
then it has adopted a different policy. Besides its relations with Tajikistan, Iran 
has relations with Turkmenistan, with which it shares a long border, through 
proposals to construct new pipelines across Iran to the Persian Gulf (Rumer 
2002). However, with the exception of Turkmenistan, the other Central Asian 
republics are reluctant to have close relations with Iran due to their suspicions of 
Iranian support for the Tajik Islamic groups. Furthermore, Iran’s prospects to 
control Turkmenistan’s natural gas resources through building pipelines have 
been opposed by the US, which has significant opposition to any plans to route 
Turkmenistan’s gas through Iran and to any cooperation between Turkmenistan 
and Iran. As far as Turkey is concerned, it failed to follow its ambitions to play a 
leading role in Central Asia because of its own economic problems as well as a 
lack of enthusiasm in the region for Turkey’s leading role (Winrow 2001). 
However, thanks to its status as a member of NATO and the Western world’s 
willingness to show Turkey as a “modern and secular” model for the Central 
Asian republics, the situation turned  in favour of Turkey especially in terms of 
pipeline routes.  
 
On the other hand, because of its dominating Muslim region of Xinjiang, China 
has always supported oppressive regimes that have pursued policies against 
extremist Islam in Central Asia. It has also developed economic and trade 
relations with regional states. Furthermore, it is one of the important donors of 
military aid to Central Asia and is reported to have provided a total of USD 4.2 
million in 2002 (Perlo-Freeman and Stålenheim 2003). 
 
For the US, one of the most significant reasons to engage in the region is its 
campaign against the new threats of transnational terrorism, weapons of mass 
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destruction and “rogue states”. Since 9/11 the American military existence in the 
region has expanded. Within this context, all Central Asian republics signed 
agreements with the US for the use of their military bases and deployment of US 
troops. Even neutral Turkmenistan has granted permission for the US’ military 
overflights (Rasizade 2002). In return, the US has provided economic and military 
assistance and security guarantees for the regional states. 
 
Since 1991, Russia, China and the US have attempted to exert power on Central 
Asia. On the one hand, China, with developing economic relations with the 
Central Asian republics, has gradually increased its own sphere of influence. On 
the other hand, the US also has paid greater attention to the region as a periphery 
of its foreign policy. Especially after 9/11 the existing power structure has 
drastically changed with some of the Central Asian states’ sudden turn towards 
the US. As a consequence of American and Chinese involvement in the region, 
Russia’s role in the region has been threatened. Accompanied by the regional 
states’ attitudes in favour of the US and China, a conflictual dynamic has 
developed in terms of relations between external powers engaging in the region. 
On the one hand, the Russian Central Asia agenda has been occupied with the 
growing American influence. On the other hand, the US has tried to fetter Iranian 
involvement in the region. Furthermore, both Russia and China have competed in 
developing economic and political ties with the Central Asian states. As a 
reflection of these conflictual external dynamics and previously mentioned 
disunified internal dynamics of the region, it can be foreseen that Central Asia is 
developing into a region of strategic rivalry.  
 
The preceding section has analysed Central Asia as a regional security complex, 
examining the external and internal dynamics which determine the characteristics 
of the security. In the following section, hydropolitics as one of the major security 
issues among the regional states will be explored, and in light of the 
characteristics of the regional security complex, the possibility of a properly 
functioning water regime will be discussed. 
HYDROPOLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA: TOWARDS A REGIONAL 
WATER REGIME  
Considering the vital importance of water for human beings and societies, water 
resources are one of the particular issues that reflects a link between 
environmental degradation and the outbreak of conflicts (Horsman 2001). Thus, 
water has security implications while maintaining the core foci of security – 
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competition and violence (Horsman 2001). In most cases, water threats are 
perceived as threats to national security, as in the case of deprivation of water for 
irrigation by other riparians which may lead to economic problems, which in turn 
makes a state vulnerable to foreign pressure (Møller 2003). According to Levy 
“for any environmental threat to be a security threat, there must be some 
demonstrable connection to some vital national interests” (Levy 1995:45). As a 
result of its security implications, disputes over water and efforts to form a water 
regime will be considered as an indispensable part of the Central Asian regional 
security complex. 
 
International regimes have important effects on interdependent relations within 
the particular regional security complex. Since World War II, specific sets of rules 
have been applied as guides for international actors. International regimes are 
intermediate factors between the power structures and the bargaining that take 
place in it. Within this context, it is necessary to examine international regimes in 
order to understand their effects on the patterns of interdependence and power 
relations among units within a security complex.  
 
Regimes are defined as:  
 
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations (Krasner 1991:2).  
According to Krasner regimes are more than temporary arrangements which 
change with power and interest shifts. In this respect Keohane and Nye 
differentiate between agreements and regimes. According to them, agreements are 
“one-shot” arrangements while the purpose of regimes is to facilitate these 
arrangements (Keohane & Nye 1989). Furthermore, regime governed behaviour 
must be beyond short-term interests. In order to establish a regime, states should 
accept reciprocity and sacrifice short-term interests with the expectation that other 
actors reciprocate in the future (Krasner 1991). 
 
According to Krasner, regimes are not regarded as ends in themselves, as they 
affect related behaviour and outcomes. In the international system, mainly based 
on the idea of sovereign states, the main function of regimes is to coordinate state 
behaviour in order to achieve desired outcomes. In other words, regimes help to 
achieve desired outcomes, which cannot be achieved through uncoordinated 
individual self-interests (Krasner 1991). According to Keohane, international 
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regime formation relies on rational-choice analysis, and self-interested actors 
within the international system try to establish international regimes through 
mutual agreement (Keohane 1991). Within this context, Stein is concerned with 
the demand for regimes and his argument is also based on rational choices of self-
interested actors. He argues that: 
  
…the same forces of autonomously calculated self-interest that lie at the 
root of the anarchic international system also lay the foundation for 
international regimes…there are times when rational self-interested 
calculation leads actors to abandon independent decision making in 
favour of joint decision making (Stein 1991:132).  
Moreover, he states that by providing a legal framework, regimes may make 
agreements easy to enforce.  
 
When it comes to regime formation, Young defines three different paths to regime 
forms: (1) spontaneous, in which regimes emerge from converging expectations; 
(2) negotiated, in which regimes are formed by agreements; and (3) imposed, in 
which regimes are forced by external powers. Among these formation shifts, 
imposed regimes are the most sensitive ones to power shifts in the division of 
power in the international system since it is closely tied with the power structures 
(Young 1991). Moreover, in all types of regime formation hegemonic powers use 
their powers to sustain a regime which promotes their interests, or they can veto 
the formation of a regime which challenges their interests. In other words, in 
regime formation power, defined by Keohane and Nye (1989:1) as “the ability of 
an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do”, plays a vital 
role. Besides the influence of hegemons, the power relations among actors within 
a sub-system should be taken into consideration. Both in formation and in 
continuation of a regime, interdependency among actors and the vulnerability of 
actors towards others’ actions within the system also play major roles. According 
to Keohane and Nye, the power structure affects the nature of a regime and the 
regime in turn governs the political bargaining and decision making within the 
system (Keohane and Nye 1989). 
 
With regards to international waters, the concept of “water regimes” has been 
attracting more and more attention. Water regimes refer to the constrained 
mechanisms that guide the actions of parties in a river basin (Jagerskog 2001:1). 
Regime theory can be applied to the analysis of cooperation over river basins, and 
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offers a relevant tool for the analysis of how compromised solutions could be 
found (Jagerskog 2003:49). 
 
According to Hafterdorn (2000:65), water regimes come into existence “when 
affected states to a conflict observe a set of rules designed to reduce conflict 
caused by use, pollution or division of a water resource or the reduction of the 
standing costs and the observance over time of these rules”. He distinguishes 
between regimes that are established to deal with all future water conflicts like the 
1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water Courses and 
International Lakes and the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, and water regimes that are 
connected to a particular conflict.  
 
As far as general water regimes that are established to deal with all future water 
conflicts are concerned, it is mainly the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses that can be applied for 
transboundary river management issues in addition to regional agreements aiming 
at the resolution of particular conflicts. In the 1997 Convention, development of 
rules of international law regarding non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses is aimed to promote and implement the main principles for non-
navigational uses of transboundary watercourses. Furthermore, the general 
principles with regard to “equitable and reasonable utilization and participation” 
and “obligation not to cause significant harm” are determined by the convention 
(articles 6 and 7).   
 
In fact, the existing international water law documents are ambiguous and vague 
in the case of transboundary waters because of the uniqueness of each water 
dispute. As a result of the ambiguity of the "equitable" and "reasonable" 
distribution of water definitions in international documents, generally the riparian 
states have different perceptions and interpretations. Regardless of how 
specifically the body of law might identify what really constitutes "equitable and 
reasonable" distribution, the parties are inclined to interpret the law according to 
their own interests. Therefore, the riparians’ arguments on what constitutes 
equitable and reasonable distribution of water reflect their interests and needs. 
Within this context, riparian states have sought for regional basin-wide regimes in 
order to resolve transboundary water management problems instead of just relying 
on existing international water regimes.  
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Given its economic value, in Central Asia, where water scarcity and competition 
are acute, water has become a part of high politics and the possibility of water 
related conflicts has been increasing. The problems of increasing demand and 
declining supplies have led to unfettered competition for water. Tensions focus on 
the two main rivers of the region that both flow to the Aral Sea: the Syr Darya 
from Kyrgyzstan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and the Amu Darya from 
Tajikistan through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The Amu Darya and its 
tributaries form part of the border between the Central Asian states and 
Afghanistan (see figure 1: Map of Aral Sea Basin). So far the tensions have been 
contained without any conflict, but because the regional states continue to 
consider the problem to be a “zero-sum game”, the possibility of a cooperative 
resolution is getting harder to reach.   
 
Around 90% of the region’s crops need irrigation. Cotton is the most valuable 
product for the regional economies, particularly for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
Cotton production employs 44% of Turkmenistan’s work force and makes up 
76% of Uzbekistan’s revenues (Horsman 2001). As far as upstream countries are 
concerned, over 50% of Kyrgyztan’s and Tajikistan’s electricity production relies 
on hydroelectric power. Within this context: 
 
…an annual cycle of disputes has developed between the three 
downstream countries - Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - that 
are all heavy consumers of water for growing cotton, and the upstream 
nations - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The downstream countries require 
more water for their growing agricultural sectors and rising 
populations, while the economically weaker upstream countries are 
trying to win more control over their resources and want to use more 
water for electricity generation and farming (ICG Asia Report 2002:i). 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, water management has become a complex 
transboundary water management problem. During the Soviet Union era, the 
Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources in Moscow was the single 
official agency responsible for water allocation. It was also assigned as the final 
arbiter for solving disagreements. With the independence of the Central Asian 
states, this centralized structure fragmented into the hands of five governments 
who have different policy priorities and are very reluctant to work together. 
Furthermore competition among regional states has caused failures in providing a 
feasible regional approach to replace the Soviet water management system, in 
which quotas, fixed by Moscow, favoured the downstream cotton-producers at the 
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expense of mountainous and less developed Kyrgyztan and Tajikistan (ICG Asia 
Report 2002). 
 
In other regions, where water is shared by different states, water management 
strategies between riparians have evolved gradually. But in the Central Asia case, 
states were forced to develop a ground for water management as a result of an 
urgent need for a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures regulating water allocation relations among regional states. 
With the interventions of international donor organizations and environmental 
NGOs, five newly independent states signed the Almaty Agreement in 1992, as an 
expression of their willingness to work towards joint coordination and action over 
water resources. Following the Almaty Agreement, a number of institutions 
concerning water management were established: the Interstate Coordinating 
Water Commission (ICWC), the sub-ordinate Amu Darya and Syr Darya Basin 
Management Authorities (BVOs), the Interstate Council on Problems of the Aral 
Sea Basin (ICAS), and the International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS). In spite of 
the existence of external intervention in the regime formation over shared river 
basins, the “water regime” that is formed by Central Asian states cannot be called 
an imposed regime. Rather, it has emerged from converging expectations and 
formed spontaneously, aiming at water allocation among the republics, regulation, 
use and protection of watercourses, and avoidance of disputes before they arise. 
 
While some optimistic donor organizations and international institutions consider 
these institutionalisation efforts to establish a water regime as an example of a 
success story, there are still serious areas of tensions over water management 
among the Central Asian states. According to the ICG’s report entitled Central 
Asia: Water and Conflict, these institutionalised efforts for transboundary water 
management in the region have just imposed a very similar version of Soviet 
central planning and not provided an effective ground for long-term water 
allocation disputes since the new states will not be satisfied with the economic 
roles previously assigned by Moscow. Furthermore, the inter-state institutions’, 
namely the ICWC and the IFAS, lack of transparency and narrow focus 
emphasizing mainly water division, have led to a failure in dealing with rising 
tensions over water resources (ICG Asia Report 2002). In spite of the agreements 
signed, institutional arrangements cannot be regarded as successful because of the 
weak political commitment and cooperation, and financial and legal constraints 
(Bedford and Micklin in Horsman 2001). In this regard, the question that arises is: 
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can transboundary water management in Central Asia be considered as a 
regional water regime?  
 
According to Krasner, in the international system the main function of regimes is 
to help achieve desired outcomes which cannot be achieved through 
uncoordinated individual self-interests (Krasner 1991). In order to form 
international regimes, rational self-interested calculations must lead actors to 
abandon independent decision-making in favour of joint decision-making. 
However, in the Central Asia case, individual states still put their own self-interest 
and decision-making before joint interests and decision-making. The disunified 
character of the internal dynamics of the region does not encourage efforts to form 
a regional water regime. Furthermore, amongst the Central Asian states there is no 
particular state that has the power to enforce a regime formation. As previously 
mentioned, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are equally powerful and 
they are far from forming alignments with each other especially in light of the 
political rivalry between the leaders of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Thus, as far 
as regional decisions are concerned this rivalry restricts the potential for 
compromise. 
 
The potentially unstable water security issue of the region has attracted extra-
regional interests. Three neighbouring states, Afghanistan, China and Iran, outside 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, plus the US have direct impacts on 
regional water security because of their hydrologic boundaries with the regional 
states. Among the three, Iran has a trivial effect because only 2% of its territory 
and less than 1% of its population are within the basin (Horsman 2001). On the 
other hand, Afghanistan with 40% of its territory and 33% of its population within 
the Aral Sea Basin has a more complex impact. The absence of Afghanistan from 
regional water institutions weakens the possibility of a long-term regional water 
regime. For China, water demands and policies are interlinked with its economic 
and political objectives in Xinjiang region. China has planned to extract water 
from two of the tributaries in order to stimulate the economy of Xinjiang, to raise 
living standards and to reduce support for Uigur irredentism. If this plan succeeds, 
it will reduce one of the sources of transboundary security issues for the region 
(Horsman 2001). As far as the US is concerned, it has used environmental 
assistance for security objectives. According to Weinthal, the Aral Sea crisis has 
offered a safe issue area for US foreign policy in Central Asia (Weinthal 2000). 
Through the Agency for International Development (USAID), confidence 
building and cooperation among regional states have been attempted and some 
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environmental projects have been implemented. But the main objective for the US 
is to create a stable regional environment for its economic interests in the oil and 
gas sector and create a counter balance for Iranian influence in the region.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Disputes over water resources are one of the major threats for the Central Asian 
republics’ security. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, water management 
has turned into a very complicated transboundary water management problem 
among five Central Asian states. Both internal and external dynamics of the 
Central Asian regional security complex have played roles in the resolution or 
non-resolution of the water management disputes.  
 
In spite of the existence of some half-hearted attempts, a regional water security 
regime has not been achieved yet. As a result of the competition among regional 
states in terms of enforcing their own national interests at the expense of other 
states’ vulnerabilities, regional cooperation over water allocation is still 
problematic and fragile.  
 
Internal dynamics of the region, competing interests, and the absence of powerful 
actors among the regional states has negatively effected the formation of a water 
regime. On the other hand, international involvement has acted neither as a 
medium nor as a solution for regional water disputes. External actors are unable to 
influence the internal dynamics of the region since their involvement has  been 
aimed at securing their own interests regardless of regional dynamics.  
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